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  Associate Justice Clarence Thomas is hardly known as a warrior 
for either the civil rights movement or the African-American 
community. The most conservative Justice on the U.S. Supreme 
Court, Thomas has consistently voted against what many perceive to 
be the interests of African Americans, and he has proudly led the 
charge to dismantle the crowning jewels of the civil rights movement, 
particularly affirmative action. But Thomas, this Note argues, 
nonetheless views himself as both a civil rights leader and an advocate 
for the African-American community. He believes that affirmative 
action and similar initiatives have obstructed the path to true racial 
equality, and he has fully committed himself to clearing the way. To 
bolster and legitimize his opposition to affirmative action, Thomas 
has relied on the words and principles of John Marshall Harlan, the 
Supreme Court’s first civil rights advocate. Although Harlan’s 
contemporaries failed to appreciate the wisdom behind his lonesome 
dissents, Harlan has since been hailed as a “great dissenter” and a 
prophetic champion of civil rights. This Note argues that Thomas, 
intrigued by Harlan’s vindication, has appropriated Harlan’s words 
and principles in an attempt to secure a similar legacy for himself. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When one thinks about the civil rights1 heroes of the twentieth 
and twenty-first centuries, Clarence Thomas,2 the most conservative 
U.S. Supreme Court Justice of his time,3 is unlikely to come to mind. 
Indeed, during the course of his legal career, Thomas has made few 
friends in the African-American community.4 He has complained that 
all civil rights leaders ever do is “bitch, bitch, bitch, moan and moan, 
whine and whine.”5 He has vigorously opposed affirmative action, 
which he condemns as paternalistic, patronizing, and 
counterproductive.6 Moreover, he has openly scorned the reasoning 
of Brown v. Board of Education,7 calling the landmark decision and 
all of its progeny a “missed opportunity.”8 When Thomas was 
 
 1. Technically, the term “civil rights” refers to “[t]he individual rights of personal liberty 
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights and by the 13th, 14th, 15th, and 19th Amendments, as well as 
by legislation such as the Voting Rights Act.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 263 (8th ed. 2004). 
This Note examines “civil rights” in the racial context only. This usage is consistent with the 
meaning of “civil rights” in the context of the “civil rights movement,” the organized struggle 
for racial equality that began in the 1950s with Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 
(1954), and continued through the death of Martin Luther King, Jr., in 1968. See generally 
RAYMOND D’ANGELO, THE AMERICAN CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2001) (describing how two 
hundred years of racism toward African Americans finally gave way to a formal civil rights 
movement in the 1950s). 
 2. Thomas was nominated to the United States Supreme Court in 1991 by President 
George H. W. Bush. The Justices of the Supreme Court, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/ 
biographiescurrent.pdf (last visited Sept. 14, 2008). For a general description of Thomas’s life 
and legal career, see CLARENCE THOMAS, MY GRANDFATHER’S SON (2007); KEVIN MERIDA 
& MICHAEL A. FLETCHER, SUPREME DISCOMFORT (2007). 
 3. See MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 249 (“[Thomas] emerge[d] as what many 
legal scholars call the most conservative justice on the court, the one most consistent in hewing 
to a strict, unchanging reading of the Constitution.”); JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE 99–113 
(2007) (“[Thomas] was by far the most conservative member of the Rehnquist Court, probably 
the most conservative justice since the Four Horsemen, FDR’s nemeses, retired during the New 
Deal.”); see also JEFFREY ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT 1–5 (2006) (discussing Thomas’s 
zealous devotion to his conservative principles). 
 4. See MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 3–4 (“[T]he antipathy toward Thomas 
among African Americans is wide and deep and persistent.”). 
 5. THOMAS, supra note 2, at 183. 
 6. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240–41 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“[T]here can be no doubt that racial 
paternalism and its unintended consequences can be as poisonous and pernicious as any other 
form of discrimination. So-called ‘benign’ discrimination teaches many that because of chronic 
and apparently immutable handicaps, minorities cannot compete with them without their 
patronizing indulgence.”). 
 7. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 8. Clarence Thomas, Toward a “Plain Reading” of the Constitution—The Declaration of 
Independence in Constitutional Interpretation, 30 HOW. L.J. 983, 991–92 (1987); see also SCOTT 
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nominated to the Court in 1991, the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), “the nation’s oldest and 
largest civil rights organization,” opposed his confirmation.9 
Despite this opposition, Thomas, only the second African 
American to serve on the United States’ highest Court, would like 
nothing more than to be remembered as a civil rights hero of his 
time.10 Thomas sees himself as a courageous soldier of racial 
equality,11 selflessly fighting for the natural rights avowed by the 
founders of the United States, the abolitionists of the Civil War era, 
and the civil rights giants of the twentieth century.12 As such, Thomas 
believes that he is fighting for a world in which all classifications on 
the basis of race are unconstitutional—a world that he believes the 
Declaration of Independence promises13 and the Fourteenth 
Amendment compels.14 
 
DOUGLAS GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES 48–51 (1999) (“In many of his speeches and writings, 
Thomas has been critical of the modern Supreme Court’s civil rights jurisprudence. He starts at 
the beginning, with Brown . . . .”). 
 9. MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 176. 
 10. See infra Part IV.A. 
 11. See MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 23 (“The courageous underdog is one of 
[Thomas’s] favorite personas, adopted by him in countless speeches and observed by friends in 
private conversations. Putting on his battle armor—seeing himself as a man under attack for his 
ideas—is one of the ways Thomas copes with the ostracism he endures from blacks who disagree 
with him.”). 
 12. See GERBER, supra note 8, at 41 (“Thomas himself pointed out . . . that political giants 
such as Martin Luther King, Jr., Abraham Lincoln, and the Founders of our nation believed that 
the Constitution should be interpreted in light of natural law.”); Thomas, supra note 8, at 986 
(“[T]o accept Lincoln’s interpretation of the American Founding is not merely to go with the 
winner, or indulge in a sentimental reminiscence about the Great Emancipator . . . . [It would 
also] preserve what is strongest in the original Civil Rights movement: its insistence that what it 
demanded is what America had always promised . . . .”). 
 13. See infra notes 82–87 and accompanying text; see also THE DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are 
created equal, that they are endowed by the Creator with certain unalienable Rights . . . .”). 
 14. See infra notes 82–87 and accompanying text. The Fourteenth Amendment says that 
“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. Congress proposed 
the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866 and the states ratified thereafter. See ANDREW KULL, THE 
COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION 82–87 (1992) (describing the proposal and ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment). It was added to the Constitution following the Civil War along with 
the Thirteenth Amendment and the Fifteenth Amendment. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 207 (2d ed. 2005). Scholars sometimes refer to these three amendments 
as the “Reconstruction amendments.” See, e.g., Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Toward a Pragmatic 
Understanding of Status-Consciousness: The Case of Deregulated Education, 50 DUKE L.J. 753, 
838 n.423 (2000) (“Brown reaffirmed the role for the federal government implied in the 
Reconstruction amendments by nationalizing civil rights.” (emphasis added)). 
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To achieve this racial equality, Thomas believes that the United 
States must first tread backward nearly fifty-five years to the Court’s 
landmark decision in Brown, where Thomas believes that the fight for 
racial equality went tragically astray.15 The “great flaw” of Brown, 
according to Thomas, is that the Court did not rely on the lonely 
dissent of John Marshall Harlan16 in Plessy v. Ferguson,17 which 
affirmed the importance of the “Founders’ constitutional 
principles,”18 and rightly declared the Constitution “color-blind.”19 As 
a result, Thomas argues, the Court did not establish a per se rule that 
all classifications on the basis of race are unconstitutional, leaving 
Harlan’s colorblind Constitution, and the founders’ constitutional 
principles, unsatisfied.20 Moreover, Thomas contends, this failure 
opened the door for affirmative action and other initiatives designed 
to help African Americans adapt to life after segregation—initiatives 
that Thomas believes disempowered African Americans and 
obscured the dream of a colorblind Constitution.21 
In an effort to remedy Brown’s “great flaw,” Thomas has 
borrowed the words and principles of John Marshall Harlan, 
 
 15. See Thomas, supra note 8, at 991–92 (“Brown was a missed opportunity, as [was] all its 
progeny . . . . The task of those involved in securing the freedom of all Americans is to turn 
policy toward reason rather than sentiment, toward justice rather than sensitivity, toward 
freedom rather than dependence—in other words, toward the spirit of the Founding. These 
steps would validate the Brown decision, by replacing the Warren opinion with one resting on 
reason and moral and political principles, as established in the Constitution and the Declaration 
of Independence, rather than on feelings.”). 
 16. John Marshall Harlan was appointed to the Court in 1877 by President Rutherford B. 
Hayes, LINDA PRZYBYSZEWSKI, THE REPUBLIC ACCORDING TO JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN 41 
(1999), and served until his death in 1911, id. at 188. Harlan’s grandson, John Marshall Harlan II 
(Harlan II), served on the Court from 1955 until 1971 and was a consistent dissenter on the 
Warren Court. See generally TINSLEY E. YARBOROUGH, JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN (1992) 
(describing the life and jurisprudence of Harlan II, the “great dissenter” of the Warren Court). 
 17. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 18. Thomas, supra note 8, at 990. 
 19. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (“Our constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor 
tolerates classes among citizens.”). 
 20. See Thomas, supra note 8, at 991 (“The Brown psychology makes the legal and social 
environment all-controlling: ‘the feeling of inferiority’ or ‘the sense of inferiority’ is the 
problem. . . . Thus, the Brown focus on environment overlooks the real problem with 
segregation, its origin in slavery, which was at fundamental odds with the founding principles.”). 
 21. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“So-called ‘benign’ discrimination . . . 
stamp[s] minorities with a badge of inferiority and may cause them to develop dependencies or 
to adopt an attitude that they are ‘entitled’ to preferences.”).  
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Thomas’s own judicial hero22 and the Court’s only civil rights 
champion at the turn of the twentieth century.23 Although Harlan’s 
contemporaries largely dismissed Harlan as a “moralizing eccentric” 
during his time on the Court,24 Brown and its progeny dramatically 
vindicated his civil rights dissents, and commentators since Brown 
have celebrated him as a great prophet of racial equality.25 
This Note argues that Thomas, during his tenure on the Court, 
has used Harlan’s words and principles to manipulate the meaning of 
Brown to reflect his own equal protection philosophy. Armed with 
Harlan’s colorblind Constitution, Thomas has fought vigorously for 
the racial equality that he believes the founders promised in the 
Declaration of Independence. Although his cause is unpopular with 
his contemporaries, Thomas is confident that one day history will 
vindicate his views, and he, like Harlan, will be hailed as a prophetic 
leader of civil rights.26 
Part I of this Note describes how Thomas’s life experiences, 
particularly his experiences as a racial minority, have greatly 
influenced his judicial philosophy. Part II illustrates how Thomas has 
used the natural law principles of Harlan and other nineteenth-
century scholars to hone his equal protection philosophy. Part III 
argues that Thomas has appropriated Harlan’s colorblind 
Constitution to redefine the meaning of Brown to reflect his equal 
protection philosophy. Part IV demonstrates that despite the 
condemnation he has received from the African-American 
community, Thomas believes that he is a prophetic champion of civil 
rights, and suggests that Thomas has sacrificed his contemporary 
significance on the Court so that he, like Harlan, can have his lonely 
civil rights opinions vindicated by history. 
I.  AN UNLIKELY ADVOCATE 
In his memoirs, Thomas recalls a courtesy visit he received upon 
his confirmation to the Court from his predecessor, Thurgood 
 
 22. MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 249–50. 
 23. PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note 16, at 8. 
 24. See ROSEN, supra note 3, at 77 (describing how commentators regarded Harlan as a 
moralizing eccentric for much of American history). 
 25. E.g., id. at 80. 
 26. See infra notes 216–26 and accompanying text. 
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Marshall,27 a “civil rights icon”28 and the mastermind behind Brown.29 
The visit “ballooned into a two-and-a-half-hour” discussion, during 
which Thomas told Marshall, “I would have been shoulder to 
shoulder with you back then—if I’d had the courage.”30 Marshall, 
nicknamed “Mr. Civil Rights” for his legal advocacy on behalf of 
African Americans,31 apparently responded, “I did in my time what I 
had to do. . . . You have to do in your time what you have to do.”32 
Because Thomas was assuming Marshall’s seat on the Court, this 
encounter represented a passing of the gavel between Marshall and 
his successor. But by Thomas’s account of the visit, strategically 
placed at the end of his autobiography,33 Marshall was passing to 
Thomas more than his place on the Court—Marshall was passing his 
position as a civil rights advocate. Marshall’s words have stayed with 
Thomas throughout his tenure on the Court.34 Thomas’s version of 
civil rights advocacy, however, was probably not what Marshall, the 
revered architect of Brown, had in mind. 
To many African Americans, Thomas’s ideology appears cold, 
radical, and severe.35 Thomas denounces affirmative action as 
patronizing and paternalistic, arguing that special treatment on 
account of race can only promote dependency and a sense of 
entitlement within minority groups.36 For similar reasons, Thomas has 
forcefully condemned public benefit programs designed to assist 
individuals living below the poverty line,37 and he has shown no 
 
 27. See ROSEN, supra note 3, at 3 (“Thomas, a southern black conservative, was George H. 
W. Bush’s choice to replace the civil rights icon Thurgood Marshall in 1991.”). 
 28. Id.; see also U. W. Clemon & Bryan K. Fair, Lawyers, Civil Disobedience, and Equality 
in the Twenty-First Century, 54 ALA. L. REV. 959, 960 (2003) (“[Marshall] sacrificed his life to 
liberate all Americans from the stains of state-sponsored discrimination.”). 
 29. For information on Marshall’s role in Brown, see JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD 
MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY 209–25 (1998). 
 30. THOMAS, supra note 2, at 286. 
 31. MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 9. 
 32. THOMAS, supra note 2, at 286. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 39. 
 36. E.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240–41 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 37. See Juan Williams, Black Conservatives, Center Stage, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 1980, at 
A21 (“Thomas is also a man who has a sister on welfare back in his home state of Georgia, but 
he feels that he must be opposed to welfare because of the dependency it can breed in a person. 
‘She [his sister] gets mad when the mailman is late with her welfare check,’ he says. ‘That is how 
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sympathy for those who turn to crime to make ends meet.38 As one 
NAACP leader bemoaned, Thomas “sides in almost every instance 
with the powerful over those without power,” voting “directly against 
the interest of blacks.”39 
Ironically, however, Thomas has largely built his judicial 
philosophy around what he perceives to be the interests of African 
Americans; he has simply defined those interests differently. To 
achieve a world in which the color of one’s skin is “truly the least 
important thing about a person,”40 Thomas argues, “the Constitution 
and the nation it form[ed] [must] be interpreted to its highest, not 
simply as an efficient functioning instrument that parcels out foods to 
different competing interest groups.”41 True racial equality, Thomas 
believes, requires strict limits on government power.42 Though some 
Americans may suffer as a result of a limited government, Thomas 
admits, freedom must come at that price.43 
 
dependent she is. What’s worse is that now her kids feel entitled to the check too. They have no 
motivation for doing better or getting out of that situation.’” (alteration in original)). 
 38. See Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 478 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The power 
to be lenient is [also] the power to discriminate.” (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 
(1993) (internal quotations omitted))); MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 90–91 (“Once 
our legal system accepted the general premise that social conditions and upbringing could be 
excuses for harmful conduct, the range of causes that might prevent society from holding 
anyone accountable for his actions became potentially limitless.” (quoting ClarenceThomas)). 
 39. MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 248 (quoting Wade Henderson, former director 
of the Washington bureau of the NAACP). 
 40. Clarence Thomas, Affirmative Action Goals and Timetables: Too Tough? Not Tough 
Enough!, 5 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 402, 403 n.3 (1987). 
 41. Thomas, supra note 8, at 989. 
 42. See id. (discussing the importance of “good institutions that protect and reinforce good 
intentions”). 
 43. For example, in a lecture at Ohio Northern University Pettit College of Law in 1994, 
Thomas explained: 
I do hear quite a bit about freedom and rights but little about th[e] awful 
responsibilities and consequences [that come with them]. . . . 
  . . . We often tell our children that they cannot go to a party or the movies until 
some task or chore has been done. And, yet, when we talk about rights and freedom 
in the broader context of society, at no time do we seem comfortable mentioning that 
some preconditions must be met. But, we all somehow know that freedom and 
responsibilities are equally yoked and that only in tandem can they cultivate the vast 
fields of opportunity and only in tandem can we expect to have an orderly society or 
ordered liberty. And, we all know that though we are all free to sow in the spring, 
only those who do so will reap. But, we are far more comfortable bemoaning the poor 
harvest of those who have failed to sow than we are at pointing out that one cannot 
have one without the other. Nor can we have the society that we cherish if we lose our 
will to demand that each individual discharge his responsibility or accept the 
consequences for failing to do so. 
  . . . . 
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As is the case with every Justice, Thomas is the product of his 
unique life experiences.44 His political ideology and judicial 
temperament necessarily reflect the values and beliefs that he has 
acquired throughout the course of his life. To understand the equal 
protection philosophy underpinning Thomas’s conservative ideology, 
one must examine the values Thomas learned from his grandfather 
during his upbringing in Savannah, Georgia,45 as well as Thomas’s 
own experiences with affirmative action. 
A. Callused Justice: Lessons from an Iron-Willed Man 
Thomas was born in the “tiny” Georgia town of Pinpoint,46 where 
he lived in his aunt’s “ramshackle house” with no running water and 
basically no electricity for the first few years of his life.47 But Thomas 
was mostly raised by his maternal grandparents in Savannah, where 
he and his brother were sent to live after his brother burned down his 
aunt’s home and his mother was no longer able to support them.48 
As an African American growing up in Savannah in the 1950s 
and 1960s, Thomas was a frequent victim of racism. “Many parts of 
 
  . . . To paraphrase Sir Winston Churchill, “we have nothing to offer, but blood, 
toil, tears, and sweat.” There is, today, no popular market for these, though they are 
just as necessary now to take advantage of freedom today as they were in Churchill’s 
day to secure freedom. 
Clarence Thomas, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Freedom: A Responsibility, Not a Right, 
Kormendy Lecture Before the Ohio Northern University Pettit College of Law (Apr. 7, 1994), 
in 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 5, 8–11 (1994); see also MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 280 
(“As Thomas sees it, there is no way for the nation to compensate for the sins of the 
past . . . . The best the nation can do from here on out is to play fair, even if it never has been 
before.”). 
Moreover, Thomas will not amend his position to reach a more favorable result for a 
sympathetic plaintiff. Merida and Fletcher have observed: 
Thomas says his actions are defined by the Constitution and the text of laws he is 
called on to interpret, not by how he feels about the plight of a plaintiff or a particular 
public policy issue. . . . [H]e finds the contemporary context of society all but 
irrelevant. Instead . . . he relies on the original intent of the founders. . . . Sometimes, 
Thomas explains, [consistency] puts helping someone in need or righting an obvious 
wrong beyond his reach. 
Id. at 250. 
 44. See generally ROSEN, supra note 3 (discussing judicial character and temperament). 
 45. THOMAS, supra note 2, at 6–8. 
 46. Id. at 1. 
 47. Id. at 1–4. According to Thomas, life in Pinpoint was “a daily struggle for the barest of 
essentials.” Id. at 3–4. The town was so poor that “when you got sick, you stayed that way, and 
often you died of it.” Id. 
 48. Id. at 6–8. 
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Savannah . . . clung fiercely to racial segregation,”49 forcing Thomas to 
live in fear as part of a subject class.50 Thomas learned to persevere, 
despite the racism he encountered, because of the influence of his 
grandfather,51 who was frugal, self-disciplined, and severe.52 Thomas’s 
grandfather ruled with an “iron will,” “control[ling] every aspect” of 
Thomas’s life.53 In place of warmth and praise, he used insults and 
intimidation to teach Thomas the value of hard work, responsibility, 
and diligence: 
“I could do more with a teaspoon than you can do with a shovel,” he 
snapped whenever we were shoveling dirt. “You[’re] worth less than 
a carload of dead men.” He never praised us, just as he never 
hugged us. Whenever my grandmother urged him to tell us that we 
had done a good job, he replied, “That’s their responsibility. Any 
job worth doing is worth doing right.”54 
As a result, Thomas came to appreciate the importance of 
emotional strength and physical resilience. Using “hard-earned 
calluses” as a metaphor for life, Thomas has suggested that suffering 
is sometimes necessary to overcome one’s weaknesses and diminish 
future pain: 
Our small, soft hands blistered quickly at the start of each summer, 
but Daddy never let us wear work gloves, which he considered a sign 
of weakness. After a few weeks of constant work, the bloody blisters 
gave way to hard-earned calluses that protected us from pain. Long 
 
 49. Id. at 21. 
 50. See id. at 21–22 (“The Ku Klux Klan held a convention [in Savannah] in 1960, and 250 
of its white-robed members paraded down the city’s main street one Saturday afternoon. No 
matter how curious you might be about the way white people lived, you didn’t go where you 
didn’t belong. That was a recipe for jail, or worse.”). 
 51. Thomas’s grandfather was the only father figure in his life, as his biological father 
abandoned Thomas when he was an infant. Id. at 1–2. 
 52. See id. at 13 (“Daddy made it plain, though, that there was a connection between what 
he provided for us and what he required of us. He told us that if we learned how to work, we 
would be able to live as well as he and [my grandmother] did when we grew up.”); see also 
MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 79 (“[H]e taught himself plumbing, bricklaying, 
carpentry.”). For example, Thomas’s grandfather would insist that Thomas bathe in a “teaspoon 
of water,” wash his body with “laundry detergent instead of soap,” and dry his body with a 
washcloth instead of a towel. THOMAS, supra note 2, at 17. If Thomas’s grandfather was not 
satisfied with how clean Thomas got himself, “he finished the job himself, a terrifying 
experience that [Thomas] did everything [he] could to avoid.” Id. at 17. 
 53. THOMAS, supra note 2, at 12. 
 54. Id. at 25–26. 
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after the fact, it occurred to me that this was a metaphor for life—
blisters come before calluses, vulnerability before maturity . . . .55 
This metaphor is consistent with Thomas’s general philosophy that 
coddling and overprotection can only breed dependency, 
undermining the development of other values that are necessary to 
succeed.56 This philosophy is particularly apparent in Thomas’s equal 
protection jurisprudence. Thomas believes that “conscious and 
unconscious prejudice persists in our society,”57 and that African 
Americans must “gird themselves for that reality.”58 Laws that 
“distribute benefits on the basis of race” cannot “make us equal,” 
Thomas explains; they “may cause [minorities] to develop 
dependencies or to adopt an attitude that they are ‘entitled’ to 
preferences.”59 
Thomas’s grandfather also helped shape Thomas’s opposition to 
affirmative action by instilling in Thomas an aversion to paternalistic 
treatment on account of his race. In his memoirs, Thomas uses a 
lesson from his grandfather to draw a distinction between outright 
bigots and those who “mask[] their contempt with elaborate displays 
of kindness, sympathy, or compassion”: 
The contrast reminded me of Daddy’s explanation of the difference 
between rattlesnakes and water moccasins. Both, he said, were 
deadly, but the rattlesnake was easier to spot. It rattled before it 
struck, while the water moccasin would strike silently without 
warning, making it more dangerous.60 
Like segregation and outright bigotry, Thomas argues, affirmative 
action stamps African Americans with a “badge of inferiority.”61 He 
 
 55. Id. at 25. 
 56. See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text. 
 57. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 61 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 58. MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 276. 
 59. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240–41 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 60. THOMAS, supra note 2, at 46. This comparison is strangely reminiscent of the one 
shared by Thurgood Marshall upon his retirement in 1990. When Justice Marshall stepped down 
from the Court, he was asked if President Bush should appoint an African American to replace 
him. With Thomas in mind, Marshall warned against “picking the wrong kind of negro” based 
on race alone, saying: “My dad told me way back . . . that there’s no difference between a white 
snake and a black snake. They both bite.” EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS 449 (1999) 
(quoting Thurgood Marshall). 
 61. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 241; see also THOMAS, supra note 2, at 56–57 (“It seemed to me 
that the dependency [affirmative action] fostered might ultimately prove as diabolical as 
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argues that proponents of affirmative action are even more dangerous 
than segregationists and outright bigots because they hide their 
contempt behind gestures of apparent kindness: 
At least southerners were up front about their bigotry: you knew 
exactly where they were coming from, just like the Georgia 
rattlesnakes . . . . Not so the paternalistic big-city whites who offered 
you a helping hand so long as you were careful to agree with 
them . . . . Like the water moccasin they struck without 
warning . . . .62 
Likewise, Thomas argues, affirmative action is potentially more 
destructive than segregation because it represents “a new kind of 
enslavement,” which “ultimately relie[s] on the generosity—and the 
ever changing self-interests—of politicians and activists.”63 
B. The Scars of Affirmative Action 
Thomas’s own experiences with affirmative action also greatly 
influenced his conservative judicial philosophy. During college, 
Thomas began to question the assumption of affirmative action 
programs that “all blacks [are] equally disadvantaged by virtue of 
their race alone,” regardless of socioeconomic status.64 Likewise, 
Thomas grew highly skeptical of any social science theory that 
grouped all African Americans together, arguing that such theories 
inherently suggested “that blacks could never catch up to whites.”65 
 
segregation, permanently condemning poor people to the lowest rungs of the socioeconomic 
ladder by cannibalizing the values without which they had no long-term hope of improving their 
lot.”). 
 62. THOMAS, supra note 2, at 75–76. 
 63. Id. at 56. 
 64. Id. (“Talented blacks stuck on the bottom rung of the socioeconomic ladder clearly 
deserved such help, but the ones who most often took advantage of it were considerably higher 
up on the ladder. Most of the middle-class blacks with whom I discussed these policies argued 
that all blacks were equally disadvantaged by virtue of their race alone. I thought that was 
nonsense. . . . I also thought the same policies should be applied to similarly disadvantaged 
whites.”). 
 65. Id. at 80. Thomas’s jurisprudence on the Court has reflected this skepticism. Thomas 
has founded his equal protection philosophy on the belief that “individuals should be treated as 
individuals, not as members of racial or ethnic groups.” GERBER, supra note 8, at 109. This 
belief is also evident in his commitment to individual rights, id. at 52, and his skepticism toward 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which he believes objectionably presupposes that all members of 
a particular minority group will vote in a bloc, id. at 87. Indeed, Thomas first quoted Harlan’s 
conception of a colorblind Constitution in Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 891 (1994) (Thomas, J., 
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Perhaps because of his experiences with affirmative action, Thomas 
developed an aversion to group affiliations, refusing to be placed in a 
box based on his immutable traits.66 Indeed, Thomas has drawn on his 
own experiences with affirmative action to demonstrate the 
debilitating effects of special treatment on account of race: 
As much as it stung to be told that I’d done well in the seminary 
despite my race, it was far worse to feel that I was now at Yale 
because of it. I sought to vanquish the perception that I was 
somehow inferior to my white classmates . . . . But it was futile for 
me to suppose that I could escape the stigmatizing effects of racial 
preference, and I began to fear that it would be used forever after to 
discount my achievements.67 
Ultimately, Thomas’s skepticism of “preferential policies” that 
group all African Americans together to “help [them] adjust to life 
after segregation,” led Thomas toward conservative politics and a 
narrow reading of the Constitution.68 In fact, Thomas claims that he 
first aligned himself with the Republican Party because of Ronald 
Reagan’s promise “to get government off our backs and out of our 
lives,” which Thomas greatly preferred to the “Democratic Party’s 
ceaseless promise to legislate the problems of blacks out of 
existence.”69 Legislative schemes designed to favor African 
Americans, Thomas believed, would only promote a culture of 
dependency and submission, silently undermining the values 
necessary for African Americans to progress in society.70 This belief 
would shape his jurisprudence on the Court, as his distrust of 
government interference matured into a strict, originalist ideology 
 
concurring in the judgment), to vilify what he considered a presumption of the liberal reading of 
the Voting Rights Act: that all members of a race “think alike,” id. 
 66. See MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 366 (“[Thomas] seems obsessively wary of 
racial traps, worried that he will be put in a box reserved solely for black skin. And that’s an 
intolerable thought for a man who sees boxes as anathema. So whatever racial pride Thomas 
feels is overshadowed by this greater need not to be typecast, which is a synonym for limited, 
which is a synonym for inferior.”). 
 67. THOMAS, supra note 2, at 75. 
 68. Id. at 56. 
 69. Id. at 130. 
 70. Id. “I thought that blacks would be better off if they were left alone [by the 
government],” Thomas explained, “instead of being used as guinea pigs for the foolish schemes 
of dream-killing politicians and their ideological acolytes.” Id. 
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ostensibly designed to prevent the powered from manipulating the 
Constitution in a way that could persecute minorities.71 
II.  HIGHER-LAW FOUNDATION 
To promote his own racial philosophy, Thomas has embraced a 
conservative jurisprudential ideology strictly based on the founders’ 
original intent and the Constitution’s original meaning.72 Initially, 
however, Thomas was uncomfortable with the idea of endorsing an 
ideology that had tolerated slavery and segregation.73 Before his 
ideology could be consistent with his desire for racial equality, 
Thomas needed to reconcile his racial philosophy with the reality that 
the founders and the pre-Reconstruction Constitution tolerated, if not 
expressly endorsed, the institution of slavery.74 Thomas found the 
answer in the natural law principles that Harlan and other scholars 
embraced at the turn of the twentieth century.75 
Harlan, like many other nineteenth-century scholars, believed 
that the founders and the American people were uniquely chosen by 
God and that everything that happened in America was meant to 
fulfill a divine plan.76 Harlan’s assumption that “God had established 
a moral foundation for law”77 allowed Harlan to confidently declare 
 
 71. See MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 257 (“While Thomas is no advocate for 
affirmative action, he believes that racism is alive and inescapable. But he feels the government 
is ill equipped to deal with the reality or to address the legacy of discrimination. The best thing 
that blacks and other minorities can do, therefore, to improve their circumstance is to become 
self-sufficient.”). Thomas recalls how a college friend once asked, “Clarence, as a member of a 
group that has been treated shabbily by the majority in this country, why would you want to give 
the government more power over your personal life?” THOMAS, supra note 2, at 73. The point 
apparently resonated with Thomas, as he explained: “[R]eal freedom mean[s] independence 
from government intrusion, which in turn mean[s] that you ha[ve] to take responsibility for your 
own decisions. When the government assumes that responsibility, it takes away your freedom—
and wasn’t freedom the very thing for which blacks in America were fighting?” Id. 
 72. See KEN FORKETT, JUDGING THOMAS 190 (2004) (describing Thomas’s adoption of the 
natural law principles embodied in the Declaration of Independence). 
 73. See id. (“To interpret the Constitution literally, to rely on the intentions of the framers 
was to accept the notion that black Americans were never intended to have equal rights and 
freedoms.”); cf., e.g., THOMAS, supra note 2, at 88 (describing his discomfort about working for 
a Republican). 
 74. FORKETT, supra note 72, at 190. 
 75. Id. at 191. 
 76. PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note 16, at 49. 
 77. Id. 
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that his lonely dissents were not only correct, but also inevitable.78 
This assumption also informed Harlan’s belief that the Civil War was 
necessary to fulfill the promises of the Declaration of Independence.79 
Harlan believed that the Declaration of Independence, which he 
referred to as “our political bible,” was the original founding 
document, representing a truer expression of the founders’ wishes 
than the Constitution.80 For Harlan, the Reconstruction amendments 
constitutionalized the universal equality that the founders promised 
in the Declaration of Independence.81 
Harlan’s natural law principles offered Thomas an intriguing way 
to reconcile his commitment to equality with his originalist ideology. 
Through natural law, Thomas could simply denounce the institution 
of slavery as repugnant to the founders’ words and principles: 
I led my staffers . . . in discussions of the natural-law philosophy with 
which the Declaration of Independence, America’s first founding 
document, is permeated. “All men are created equal,” Thomas 
Jefferson had written in 1776. “They are endowed by their Creator 
with certain unalienable Rights.” That’s natural law in a nutshell: if 
all men are created equal, then no man can own another man, and 
we can only be governed by our consent. How, then, could a country 
founded on those principles have permitted slavery and segregation 
to exist? The answer was that it couldn’t—not without being untrue 
to its own ideals.82 
To infuse natural law principles into his own ideology, Thomas 
embraced a form of originalism that is rooted in the principles of the 
founders rather than solely the practices of the founders.83 This brand 
 
 78. See id. at 51 (“Perhaps this faith was what allowed Harlan to joke about his dissents; 
not only did he know that he was right, but also he knew that right was unchanging and would 
prevail eventually.”). 
 79. See id. at 62–64 (“In order for all Americans to claim civil rights, the Civil War had to 
be fought and the slaves freed. Far from disrupting the course of American history, these events 
fulfilled the country’s providential mission. The emancipation of blacks answered the wish of 
the founders.”). 
 80. Id. at 64 (quoting John Marshall Harlan, Remarks at the Unveiling of Memorial 
Tablets of Former Presidents of Centre College (June 19, 1891)). 
 81. Id. at 49. 
 82. THOMAS, supra note 2, at 188. 
 83. See GERBER, supra note 8, at 103–04 (describing this approach as “liberal,” as opposed 
to “conservative,” originalism); see also Jeffrey Rosen, The Color-Blind Court, 45 AM. U. L. 
REV. 791 (1996) (critiquing both liberals’ and conservatives’ interpretations of the 
Reconstruction amendments). For further elaboration on the differences between “liberal” and 
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of originalism allowed Thomas to use the principles that the founders 
expressed in the Declaration of Independence to color the meaning of 
the founders’ words in the Constitution.84 Thus, Thomas was able to 
adopt a natural law philosophy reminiscent of that to which Harlan 
and other nineteenth-century scholars subscribed. 
Like Harlan, Thomas views the Declaration of Independence as 
a truer expression of the framers’ ideals—ideals that were finally 
realized when the Reconstruction amendments were added to the 
Constitution following the Civil War.85 Accordingly, Thomas believes 
that the Reconstruction amendments injected into the Constitution 
the innate right to equality that the founders promised in the 
Declaration of Independence.86 In doing so, Thomas argues, the 
Reconstruction amendments purged the Constitution of the taint of 
slavery, rendering the Constitution colorblind.87 
Thomas has also praised Harlan’s understanding of the “‘higher 
law’ background of the Constitution.”88 He appears to share Harlan’s 
belief that there is a divine foundation for the law.89 Like Harlan, 
Thomas is a deeply religious individual.90 His belief in higher law may, 
as it did for Harlan, bolster Thomas’s confidence in the correctness 
and inevitability of his own separate opinions. 
 
“conservative” originalism, see SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE 
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 1–8 (1995). 
 84. GERBER, supra note 8, at 103–04; John C. Eastman, Taking Justice Thomas Seriously, 2 
GREEN BAG 2D 425, 426 (1999) (book review) (“[I]t is a jurisprudence rooted in the self-evident 
truths of human nature and the inalienable rights derived from that nature, as articulated in the 
Declaration of Independence.”). 
 85. See Thomas, supra note 8, at 994 (“The original Constitution’s guarantee clause, read in 
light of the Declaration of Independence, points in the direction of abolition . . . . The proper 
way to interpret the Civil War amendments is as extensions of the promise of the original 
Constitution which in turn was intended to fulfill the promise of the Declaration.”). 
 86. Id. 
 87. See id. at 995 (“[T]oo many of us today ignore . . . Harlan’s splendid exegesis of the 
‘original intention’ of the Civil War amendments . . . . The first principles of equality and 
liberty . . . . could lead us above petty squabbling over ‘quotas,’ ‘affirmative action,’ and race-
conscious remedies for social ills.”). 
 88. Id. at 993. 
 89. See, e.g., id. at 995 (linking natural law with the “laws of nature and of nature’s God” 
referred to in the Declaration of Independence). 
 90. See MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 335–38 (describing the “central role of 
religion in [Thomas’s] life”). 
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*          *          * 
Thomas has used natural law to both affirm and legitimate his 
conservative ideology. Natural law represents “the perfect expression 
of [Thomas’s] desire to transcend his concerns for race and civil 
rights,” allowing Thomas to both “preserve[] his care for the fate of 
Black Americans” and “speak intelligently and in a principled fashion 
about politics and society in general.”91 Moreover, as Part III 
demonstrates, it has offered Thomas a way to glorify his fight for his 
own racial philosophy. 
III.  HARLAN’S COLORBLIND CONSTITUTION 
Whereas the natural law principles Thomas borrowed from 
Harlan and other nineteenth-century scholars have allowed Thomas 
to legitimate his racial philosophy, Harlan’s dissent in Plessy has 
provided Thomas the ammunition to fight for it. In Thomas’s quest 
for racial equality, Harlan’s colorblind Constitution has become his 
rallying cry. 
A. Harlan’s Dissent in Plessy 
Plessy examined whether a Louisiana statute that required 
railroad companies to segregate passengers on account of their race 
into separate but equal seating accommodations was constitutional.92 
An eight-judge majority upheld the statute, reasoning that, so long as 
the accommodations are equal, racial segregation does not offend the 
Fourteenth Amendment.93 The majority dismissed the argument that 
the “enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race 
with a badge of inferiority,” emphasizing the facial neutrality of the 
act.94 If the enforced separation did produce a feeling of inferiority, 
the majority assured, “it [was] not by reason of anything found in the 
 
 91. Ken Masugi, Natural Right and Oversight: The Use and Abuse of “Natural Law” in the 
Clarence Thomas Hearings, 9 POL. COMM. 231, 232–33 (1992). 
 92. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 540 (1896). 
 93. Id. at 544. Although “the object of the [Fourteenth Amendment] was undoubtedly to 
enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law,” the majority explained, “it could 
not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as 
distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms 
unsatisfactory to either.” Id. 
 94. Id. at 551. 
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act, but solely because the colored race [had chosen] to put that 
construction upon it.”95 
In his lonely dissent, Harlan interpreted the Fourteenth 
Amendment much more expansively than the majority. According to 
Harlan, the Fourteenth Amendment includes in it not only “the right 
to exemption from unfriendly legislation against [African Americans] 
distinctively as colored,” but also the right to “exemption from legal 
discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society . . . which are steps 
towards reducing them to the condition of a subject race.”96 Harlan 
refused to ignore the clear discriminatory purpose behind the 
Louisiana statute’s neutral guise.97 Because Louisiana intended to 
reduce African Americans to “the condition of a subject race,” the 
statute offended the Fourteenth Amendment.98 
Harlan’s dissent views the Fourteenth Amendment as a 
necessary shield to protect African Americans from laws intended to 
subordinate them. It was in this vein that Harlan incorporated his 
conception of a colorblind Constitution: 
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. 
And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and 
in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it 
remains true to its great heritage and holds fast to the principles of 
constitutional liberty. But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of 
the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of 
citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and 
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.99 
The rhetorical force of the last sentence, standing alone, may 
undercut the larger point that Harlan was trying to make. The 
sentence follows logically from Harlan’s discussion of a “superior, 
dominant, ruling class,” and even designates “classes among citizens” 
as the evil that Harlan’s “color-blind” Constitution “neither knows 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 556 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 97. See id. at 557 (“Every one knows that the statute in question had its origin in the 
purpose, not so much to exclude white persons from railroad cars occupied by blacks, as to 
exclude colored people from coaches occupied by or assigned to white persons.”). 
 98. Id. at 556; accord id. at 560 (condemning the statute’s “real meaning”: that “colored 
citizens are so inferior . . . that they cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches occupied by white 
citizens”). 
 99. Id. at 559 (emphasis added). 
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nor tolerates.”100 In context, the sentence does not necessarily suggest 
that every classification on account of race would be unconstitutional. 
Rather, it appears to speak only to racial classifications intended to 
render one race subordinate to another.101 
Thus, in applying Harlan’s “color-blind” language to a 
contemporary racial classification, perhaps the debate should be over 
whether the classification in question was intended to and does 
render one race subordinate to another rather than whether the 
classification was made on account of race.  
Regardless of what Harlan originally meant when he declared 
the Constitution “color-blind,” however, Harlan’s language has 
become the rallying cry for those who argue that all classifications on 
the basis of race, whether malicious or benign, are equally offensive 
to the Constitution.102 And Thomas has emerged on the Court as the 
most vocal proponent of this interpretation of a colorblind 
Constitution. 
 
 100. Id. 
 101. For a general discussion of the differences between the antisubordination and 
anticlassification approaches to interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment, see Reva B. Siegel, 
Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over 
Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470 (2004). 
 102. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 355–56 (1978) (Brennan, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (using Harlan’s language to 
summarize the anticlassification approach). In Bakke, proponents of the antisubordination 
approach abandoned Harlan’s colorblind language. Writing on behalf of himself and three other 
Justices, Justice Brennan pronounced: 
The assertion of human equality is closely associated with the proposition that 
differences in color or creed, birth or status, are neither significant nor relevant to the 
way in which persons should be treated. Nonetheless, the position that such factors 
must be “constitutionally an irrelevance,” summed up by the shorthand phrase “[o]ur 
Constitution is color-blind,” has never been adopted by this Court as the proper 
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. Indeed, we have expressly rejected this 
proposition on a number of occasions. 
Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., 
dissenting)). 
Those who view the Fourteenth Amendment as an antisubordination doctrine generally 
disfavor the anticlassification approach associated with Harlan’s colorblind language. See, e.g., 
Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How “Color Blindness” Discourse 
Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CAL. L. REV. 77, 106 (2000) (“Because color 
blindness discourse defines ‘discrimination on the basis of race’ in highly specialized ways—as a 
practice of group-categorical differentiation that serves no instrumentally relevant end—color 
blindness discourse can both discredit and rationalize practices that perpetuate racial 
stratification.”). 
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B. Thomas’s Colorblind Constitution 
Thomas was not the first Justice to quote Harlan’s colorblind 
rhetoric, nor was he the first Justice to argue that all classifications 
made on the basis of race, including those intended to benefit 
minorities, require the strictest of scrutiny.103 The legality of 
affirmative action was fiercely debated from the start,104 and the 
dispute over what standard should be used to evaluate affirmative 
action programs was already heated by the time Thomas joined the 
Court.105 
In many ways, however, Thomas has appropriated Harlan’s 
colorblind Constitution, embracing not only Harlan’s words, but also 
what Thomas portrays to be Harlan’s underlying principles. To fully 
appreciate the genius of Harlan’s dissent, Thomas argues, Harlan’s 
words must be read in light of Harlan’s belief in “the ‘higher law’ 
background of the Constitution.”106 Harlan understood that “the 
Founders’ constitutional principles lay at the heart of the segregation 
issue,”107 and that understanding, according to Thomas, was central to 
Harlan’s invocation of a colorblind Constitution.108 Thus, Thomas has 
read Harlan’s colorblind Constitution to include not only Harlan’s 
 
 103. Cf., e.g., United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 219–22 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (arguing against special treatment for minority applicants on the grounds that such 
treatment constitutes impermissible race discrimination under Title VII). 
 104. See id. The first case that the Court heard on the constitutionality of affirmative action 
was DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (per curiam) (5–4 decision), although the Court 
ultimately dismissed the case on procedural grounds. In DeFunis, the plaintiff, a white male, 
claimed that the University of Washington Law School’s affirmative action program denied him 
admission on account of his race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 314; see also 
id. at 320–22 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (describing the law school’s program). The issue was hotly 
debated at the time, as several Justices noted in their dissents. See id. at 320 (Douglas, J., 
dissenting) (“[B]ecause of the significance of the issues raised . . . it is important to reach the 
merits.”); id. at 350 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The constitutional issues which are avoided today 
concern vast numbers of people, organizations, and colleges and universities, as evidenced by 
the filing of twenty-six amicus curiae briefs. Few constitutional questions in recent history have 
stirred as much debate, and they will not disappear.”). 
 105. Compare Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 472 (1980) (requiring only intermediate 
scrutiny for federal affirmative action programs), and Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 
564 (1990) (same), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226–27 
(1995), with City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion) 
(advocating strict scrutiny for state and local affirmative action programs). 
 106. Thomas, supra note 8, at 993. 
 107. Id. at 990. 
 108. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Our Constitution is 
color-blind and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.”). 
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rhetoric but also his own interpretation of Harlan’s natural law 
principles—the very principles that Thomas has embraced to justify 
his conservative ideology.109 Armed with his own construction of 
Harlan’s colorblind Constitution, Thomas has taken aim at the one 
case most often associated with racial equality: Brown v. Board of 
Education. 
C. Redefining Brown and the Modern Era of Equal Protection 
Jurisprudence 
The eloquence of Harlan’s dissent in Plessy, along with Harlan’s 
prediction that history would judge Plessy’s holding unfavorably,110 
rendered the dissent something of a war cry for the pre-Brown civil 
rights movement. Fifty years after Plessy was decided, for example, 
Harlan’s dissent “became a kind of bible” for Thurgood Marshall, 
 
 109. See discussion supra Part II. Although Thomas has used Harlan’s words and ideas to 
reconcile inconsistencies in his own ideology, Thomas has conveniently ignored the parts of 
Harlan’s character and jurisprudence that would undermine Thomas’s construction of a 
colorblind Constitution. One such aspect of Harlan’s character is Harlan’s paternalistic attitude 
toward civil rights. See PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note 16, at 18 (attributing Harlan’s “demand for 
the legal equality of blacks” to his paternalistic “sense of white obligation to black 
dependents”). Despite Harlan’s civil rights advocacy on the Court, he was nonetheless a slave 
owner until the Civil War. Id. at 26–27. The Harlan family supported gradual emancipation (as 
opposed to abrupt abolition), viewing slavery as “a form of social welfare,” id. at 20, 22, in which 
Caucasians and African Americans “liv[ed] in stratified yet mutually devoted company,” 
because of “a sense of white obligation to black dependents,” id. at 18. Harlan’s treatment of 
“gifted slave[s],” to whom he offered freedom, confirms this perspective. See id. at 23 (implying 
that Harlan felt average slaves were not competent to live as freemen). It is a perspective that 
unquestionably assumes that the races are fundamentally different—an assumption that Harlan 
continued to rely on during his tenure on the Court and even expressed in his dissent in Plessy: 
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it is, in 
prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will 
continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage and holds fast to the 
principles of constitutional liberty. 
Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Yet, as Section C demonstrates, one of Thomas’s 
principal arguments for a colorblind Constitution is that racially preferential treatment is 
patronizing and paternalistic, implying that African Americans are inherently inferior to 
Caucasians. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“There can be no doubt that the 
paternalism that appears to lie at the heart of this [racial set-aside] program is at war with the 
principle of inherent equality that underlies and infuses our Constitution.”). It is ironic that 
Thomas has chosen to borrow much of his civil rights approach from a Justice who, in a region 
filled with rattlesnakes, was the quintessential water moccasin. See supra notes 60–62 and 
accompanying text. 
 110. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“In my opinion, the judgment this 
day rendered will, in time, prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal 
in the Dred Scott case.”). 
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who “liked to read it aloud for inspiration as he prepared to argue 
Brown v. Board of Education.”111 
When Brown was decided in 1954,112 however, the short, 
unanimous decision did not fully vindicate Harlan’s “color-blind” 
Constitution. Brown held that state laws requiring racially segregated 
schools violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,113 expressly overruling Plessy in the field of public 
education.114 The Brown Court did not, however, specifically quote or 
cite Harlan’s dissent, leaving it unclear which elements of the dissent, 
if any, had actually influenced the Court’s reasoning. 
Furthermore, the Court’s holding in Brown was much narrower 
than Harlan’s argument in Plessy. Neither the text nor the reasoning 
of Brown appears to overrule the “separate but equal” doctrine 
outside the context of education. Rather, Brown relied on social 
science research specific to the field of public education to conclude 
that “[t]o separate [African-American children] from others of similar 
age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling 
of inferiority as to their status in the community.”115 Likewise, the 
decision focused on the “importance of education to our democratic 
society,”116 and the Court’s holding was narrowly circumscribed to 
that end. The Court held that “in the field of public education, the 
doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place. Separate educational 
facilities are inherently unequal.”117 Thus, although Brown secured 
Harlan’s legacy as a great and prophetic dissenter,118 the decision left 
Harlan’s dissent in Plessy unsatisfied. 
Despite the education-specific nature of Brown, the Court 
subsequently used the decision, without further explanation, to strike 
down state laws mandating segregation of other public facilities.119 In 
 
 111. ROSEN, supra note 3, at 125–26. 
 112. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 113. Id. at 495; see also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (prohibiting the federal 
government from maintaining racially segregated schools on the grounds that such federal 
action violates the “due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment”). 
 114. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494–95 (“Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this 
[holding] is rejected.”). 
 115. Id. at 494. 
 116. Id. at 493. 
 117. Id. at 495 (emphases added). 
 118. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 119. See, e.g., Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (per curiam) (courtroom seating); 
Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (per curiam) (public restaurants); Gayle v. 
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doing so, the Court interpreted Brown to stand for the principle that 
all separate facilities are inherently unequal, overruling Plessy 
entirely120 and “usher[ing] in the modern era of equal protection 
jurisprudence.”121 
Because the Court never explained why segregation outside the 
field of public education was unconstitutional, however, the Court left 
the meaning of Brown, and thus the rationale for the modern era of 
equal protection jurisprudence, both unclear and “uniquely 
malleable.”122 Once it became necessary to sculpt the contours of 
equal protection, Harlan’s dissent in Plessy, which did articulate a 
rationale for why all government-enforced segregation is 
unconstitutional, became an ironic123 source of ammunition against 
the antisubordination approach. This Section argues that Thomas has 
capitalized on Brown’s malleability, using his own equal protection 
philosophy and Harlan’s colorblind rhetoric to redefine the rationale 
for the modern era of equal protection jurisprudence. 
1. Brown’s “Great Flaw.”  In 1987, three years before his 
nomination to the Court, Thomas published an article in the Howard 
Law Journal calling Brown and all of its progeny a “missed 
opportunity.”124 Brown’s “great flaw,” Thomas argued, “is that it did 
not rely on Harlan’s dissent in Plessy,”125 which correctly called for a 
“color-blind” Constitution.126 This misstep, Thomas suggested, not 
 
Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam) (municipal bus system); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 
350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam) (municipal golf course); Mayor of Balt. v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 
877 (1955) (per curiam) (public beaches, bathhouses, and swimming pools). 
 120. See KULL, supra note 14, at 161–62 (describing the Court’s unexplained extension of 
Brown to proscribe all de jure segregation). 
 121. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 617. Prior to Brown, the Court had interpreted the 
Equal Protection Clause very narrowly, limiting the clause’s scope to bar discrimination only 
against African Americans. See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1872) 
(“We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by way of discrimination 
against [African Americans] as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to come 
within the purview of this provision.”). 
 122. KULL, supra note 14, at 162. 
 123. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.  
 124. Thomas, supra note 8, at 991. 
 125. Id. at 990. 
 126. See id. at 992 (arguing that “Justice Harlan’s Plessy opinion is a good example of 
thinking in the spirit of the founding” but “[l]argely as a result of the dubious reasoning of the 
post-Plessy Court, and a national indifference to the rights of all Americans, Justice Harlan’s 
argument that the Constitution is ‘color-blind’ did not rally supporters”). 
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only abandoned the founders’ constitutional principle,127 it also 
opened the door for a new generation of racial subordination in the 
form of affirmative action.128 Thomas claimed that had the Brown 
Court embraced Harlan’s conception of a colorblind Constitution, 
instead of relying on social science, Brown could have represented 
“reason rather than sentiment,” “justice rather than sensitivity,” and 
“freedom rather than dependence.”129 To correct this “cynical 
rejection of ‘the laws of nature and of nature’s God,’”130 Thomas 
argued, the Court must mend the errors of the Brown Court, and 
replace “the Warren opinion” with the spirit of Harlan’s incisive 
dissent.131 
2. Mending the Errors of the Brown Court.  In his confirmation 
hearing, Thomas dismissed his prior criticism of Brown and its 
progeny as the ponderings of “a part-time political theorist.”132 His 
previous theorizing, however, proved indicative of his subsequent 
civil rights jurisprudence. During his first sixteen terms on the Court, 
Thomas has attempted to remedy Brown’s “great flaw,” writing 
passionate separate opinions that reject the parts of Brown he 
disagrees with in favor of his own beliefs about what the Brown Court 
should have held. In the process, Thomas has gradually aligned 
Harlan’s colorblind rhetoric with his own equal protection 
philosophy. 
In Missouri v. Jenkins,133 Thomas became the first Supreme Court 
Justice to openly criticize the reasoning of Brown.134 Although 
 
 127. Thomas contended that 
[t]he Brown psychology makes the legal and social environment all-controlling: “the 
feeling of inferiority” or “the sense of inferiority” is the problem. . . . Thus, the Brown 
focus on environment overlooks the real problem with segregation, its origin in 
slavery, which was at fundamental odds with the founding principles. 
Id. at 991. 
 128. See id. at 995 (“The first principles of equality and liberty should inspire our political 
and constitutional thinking. It could lead us above petty squabbling over ‘quotas,’ ‘affirmative 
action,’ and race-conscious remedies for social ills.”). 
 129. Id. at 991. 
 130. Id. at 995 (quoting THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776)). 
 131. Id. at 991–92. 
 132. GERBER, supra note 8, at 52–53 (citing Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to be 
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 102d Cong. 237 (1991) (statement of Clarence Thomas)). 
 133. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995). 
 134. GERBER, supra note 8, at 79. 
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Thomas agreed with the majority that a district court could not order 
an interdistrict remedy to promote integration unless all of the 
districts involved had participated in the constitutional violation, 
Thomas wrote a concurring opinion denouncing Brown’s use of social 
science research as a distraction from the larger principles that Brown 
was meant to represent.135 Brown, Thomas claimed, “did not need to 
rely upon any psychological or social-science research to announce 
the simple, yet fundamental, truth that the government cannot 
discriminate among its citizens on the basis of race.”136 
While disparaging Brown’s use of social science research, 
however, Thomas mostly directed his criticism at the ways in which 
Brown has been interpreted. For example, Thomas criticized the 
district court’s reliance on social science research, attributing the 
court’s reliance to a misreading of Brown: 
Segregation was not unconstitutional because it might have caused 
psychological feelings of inferiority. . . . Psychological injury or 
benefit is irrelevant to the question of whether state actors have 
engaged in intentional discrimination—the critical inquiry for 
ascertaining violations of the Equal Protection Clause.137 
Thomas also took issue with the district court’s finding that 
“racial imbalances . . . inflict harm on black students,”138 denouncing 
the court’s assumption that “anything that is predominantly black 
must be inferior.”139 To Thomas, the district court’s position appeared 
to rest on the idea that “blacks cannot succeed without the benefit of 
the company of whites.”140 Thomas used the court’s assumption to 
condemn the “notion of Black inferiority that Brown had come to 
represent.”141 
In directing the majority of his criticism at the district court’s 
interpretation of Brown, instead of at Brown itself, Thomas was able 
to disparage the parts of Brown he disagrees with while reading his 
own principles into Brown’s ever-malleable shell: 
 
 135. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 114 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 136. Id. at 120. 
 137. Id. at 119–21. 
 138. Id. at 118. 
 139. Id. at 114. 
 140. Id. at 119. 
 141. GERBER, supra note 8, at 79. 
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As the Court’s unanimous opinion [in Brown] indicated: “[I]n the 
field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no 
place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.” At the 
heart of this interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause lies the 
principle that the government must treat citizens as individuals, and 
not as members of racial, ethnic, or religious groups. It is for this 
reason that we must subject all racial classifications to the strictest of 
scrutiny, which . . . has [almost always] proven automatically fatal.142 
Thus, in Jenkins, Thomas read Brown to mean that the Equal 
Protection Clause categorically forbids the government from treating 
individuals “as members of racial . . . groups” unless the “strictest of 
scrutiny” proves it necessary.143 This reading of Brown would soon 
become the law. 
That same day, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,144 Thomas 
cast the crucial fifth vote to hold that all government classifications on 
the basis of race, whether invidious or benign, must be reviewed 
under strict scrutiny.145 In doing so, the Court overruled Metro 
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,146 which, five years earlier, had held that 
federal affirmative action programs only required intermediate 
scrutiny.147  
In his separate opinion, Thomas came one step closer to uniting 
his own equal protection philosophy with Harlan’s colorblind 
rhetoric. “There can be no doubt,” Thomas insisted, “that the 
paternalism that appears to lie at the heart of this [racial set-aside] 
program is at war with the principle of inherent equality that 
underlies and infuses our Constitution.”148 To support this assertion, 
 
 142. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 120–21 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
 145. Id. at 227 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Although 
Adarand was the first case to hold that strict scrutiny applies to federal affirmative action 
programs, id., the Court had previously held that strict scrutiny applies to state and local 
affirmative action programs, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490–91 (1989) 
(plurality opinion). 
 146. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by Adarand, 515 U.S. at 226–
27. 
 147. Id. at 564–65; see also TERRY EASTLAND, ENDING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: THE CASE 
FOR COLORBLIND JUSTICE 127 (1997) (describing how Thomas, in replacing Marshall, joined 
the four dissenting Justices from Metro Broadcasting to overturn the precedent). 
 148. Adarand, 515 U.S at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
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Thomas cited the words of the Declaration of Independence.149 In 
doing so, Thomas relied on the natural law principles that inspired his 
interpretation of Harlan’s colorblind Constitution.150 
Eight years later, in Grutter v. Bollinger,151 Thomas relied on 
Harlan’s colorblind rhetoric directly to make the same general 
point.152 Arguing that the University of Michigan’s affirmative action 
program failed strict scrutiny because the state’s interest in a diverse 
student body could not be considered compelling, Thomas reiterated 
his belief that racial classifications intended to benefit minorities are 
just as offensive as those intended to burden minorities.153 Thomas 
concluded his thirty-page separate opinion with a nod toward both 
the Declaration of Independence and Harlan’s colorblind 
Constitution: “For the immediate future,” Thomas wrote, “the 
majority has placed its imprimatur on [affirmative action,] a practice 
that can only weaken the principle of equality embodied in the 
Declaration of Independence and the Equal Protection Clause. ‘Our 
Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes 
among citizens.’”154 Thus, Thomas read his own opposition to 
affirmative action into Harlan’s colorblind Constitution, aligning his 
own natural rights principles with those of Harlan. 
In 2007, in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle 
School District No. 1,155 Thomas broadcast Harlan’s colorblind 
rhetoric with a renewed intensity, practically reading Harlan’s words 
directly into the meaning of Brown. Although Thomas joined the 
 
 149. Id. (“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they 
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, 
Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.” (quoting THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 
2 (U.S. 1776))). 
 150. See supra notes 106–09 and accompanying text. 
 151. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 152. Id. at 349 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 153. Thomas argued that 
[t]he Constitution abhors classifications based on race, not only because those 
classifications can harm favored races or are based on illegitimate motives, but also 
because every time the government places citizens on racial registers and makes race 
relevant to the provision of burdens or benefits, it demeans us all. “Purchased at the 
price of immeasurable human suffering, the equal protection principle reflects our 
Nation’s understanding that such classifications ultimately have a destructive impact 
on the individual and our society.” 
Id. at 353 (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment)). 
 154. Id. at 378 (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
 155. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). 
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opinion of the Court, he wrote separately to address additional points 
raised by the dissent.156 In contrast to the dissenting Justices, who 
Thomas suggested “[d]isfavor[ed] a colorblind interpretation of the 
Constitution,”157 Thomas wholeheartedly endorsed Harlan’s 
colorblind words: 
Most of the dissent’s criticisms of today’s result can be traced to its 
rejection of the color-blind Constitution. The dissent attempts to 
marginalize the notion of a color-blind Constitution by consigning it 
to me and Members of today’s plurality. But I am quite comfortable 
in the company I keep. My view of the Constitution is Justice 
Harlan’s view in Plessy: “Our Constitution is color-blind, and 
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.” And my view 
was the rallying cry for the lawyers who litigated Brown.158 
This quote illustrates how Thomas has entirely equated his own equal 
protection philosophy with the sentiment Harlan expressed when he 
declared the Constitution “color-blind.” His view of the Constitution, 
Thomas insists, is Harlan’s colorblind Constitution. 
Additionally, this quote demonstrates the utility of Harlan’s 
words. Although Thomas has mostly employed Harlan’s words to 
fight for his own equal protection philosophy, he has also reached for 
Harlan’s words to shield himself from the counterassaults of his 
ideological opponents. In rejecting Harlan’s colorblind Constitution, 
Thomas appeared to suggest, the dissenters were directly assaulting 
not only Harlan’s dissent in Plessy but also the views of civil rights 
icon Thurgood Marshall and, by association, the meaning of Brown. 
Moreover, Thomas argued, the dissenters in Parents Involved were 
using the very arguments endorsed by the segregationists to do so.159 
 
 156. Id. at 2768 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Breyer wrote this dissent, which Justices 
Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg joined. Id. at 2800 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 157. Id. at 2768 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 158. Id. at 2782 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted). 
 159. Thomas wrote: 
  The dissent appears to pin its interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause to 
current societal practice and expectations, deference to local officials, likely practical 
consequences, and reliance on previous statements from this and other courts. Such a 
view was ascendant in this Court’s jurisprudence for several decades. It first appeared 
in Plessy . . . . 
  The segregationists in Brown embraced the arguments the Court endorsed in 
Plessy. Though Brown decisively rejected those arguments, today’s dissent replicates 
them to a distressing extent. 
Id. at 2783–85. 
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“What was wrong in 1954,” Thomas argued, “cannot be right 
today.”160 
After Thomas aligned the dissenters with the segregationists of 
Plessy and Brown and thus himself with the opponents of segregation 
who righteously challenged the status quo, he turned to Harlan’s 
colorblind rhetoric to sweep away whatever might remain of Brown’s 
emphasis on social science: 
Although no such distinction is apparent in the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the dissent would constitutionalize today’s faddish 
social theories that embrace that distinction. The Constitution is not 
that malleable. Even if current social theories favor classroom racial 
engineering as necessary to “solve the problems at hand,” the 
Constitution enshrines principles independent of social theories.161 
To support his assertion that “the Constitution enshrines principles 
independent of social theories,” Thomas cited the words of Harlan’s 
dissent in Plessy, including Harlan’s colorblind language.162 Thus, in a 
matter of pages, Thomas used Harlan’s words both to accuse the 
dissenters of abandoning the sentiment of Brown and to berate the 
dissenters for using a strategy that the Brown Court actually 
employed.163 
Thomas concluded his concurrence with a final invocation of 
Harlan’s colorblind Constitution: “The plans before us base school 
assignment decisions on students’ race. Because ‘our Constitution is 
color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens,’ 
such race-based decisionmaking is unconstitutional.”164 
 
 160. Id. at 2786. 
 161. Id. at 2787 (citation omitted). 
 162. Thomas quoted Justice Harlan: 
“The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it is, in 
prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will 
continue to be for all time . . . . But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, 
there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. . . . Our 
Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.” 
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting)). 
 163. See supra notes 115–18 and accompanying text. 
 164. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2788 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Plessy, 163 U.S. 
at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
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*          *          * 
Although, according to Thomas, “[t]he Constitution is not that 
malleable,”165 Brown and its progeny have proven much easier to 
manipulate.166 As best illustrated by Parents Involved in Community 
Schools, Thomas has conclusively aligned himself with Harlan’s 
colorblind Constitution, using the words of Harlan’s dissent in Plessy 
to mold the very meaning of Brown into the shape of his own 
jurisprudence.167 In doing so, Thomas has attempted to replace the 
portions of Brown that he has long despised, particularly its reliance 
on social science research, with his own ideas of what the landmark 
decision should have held. Moreover, Thomas has attempted to do so 
through a sentence that the Brown Court never explicitly embraced,168 
employed in a manner that Harlan may not have intended.169 
IV.  OUTLIVING THE WATER MOCCASINS170 
In addition to Harlan’s natural rights principles and colorblind 
Constitution, Thomas has also latched onto Harlan’s image as a great 
and prophetic dissenter. For Thomas, Harlan represents the reality 
that “[a] minority opinion on the court today can be a majority 
opinion a generation from now.”171 This Part contends that Thomas 
hopes that the ideas expressed in his separate opinions will outlive 
those of his ideological opponents and secure his legacy as the next 
great civil rights dissenter.172 
A. The Next “Mr. Civil Rights”?173 
If Thurgood Marshall bequeathed to Thomas his role as a great 
champion of civil rights,174 Thomas has been a very ungracious heir. 
Thomas has not just strayed from Marshall’s path—he has led the 
 
 165. Id. at 2787. 
 166. See supra text accompanying note 122. 
 167. See supra notes 153–64. 
 168. See supra text accompanying notes 112–18. 
 169. See supra notes 97–102, 109 and accompanying text. 
 170. See supra notes 60–62 and accompanying text. 
 171. MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 250. 
 172. The term “dissenter” is used liberally here as most of Thomas’s civil rights opinions are 
actually concurring opinions. See supra Part III.C. 
 173. See supra text accompanying note 31. 
 174. See supra text accompanying notes 27–34. 
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charge to erase Marshall’s footsteps.175 To promote what he believes 
to be in the best interest of African Americans, Thomas has 
consistently opposed the use of race-conscious means to eradicate the 
remnants of segregation, eroding many of the “hard-earned advances 
[Marshall] had helped bring about.”176 His “every vote—even his 
every public utterance, written or spoken—seems designed to outrage 
the liberal establishment that so venerated Marshall.”177 As a result, 
Thomas has been alienated by the African-American community,178 
dismissed as a sell-out, a traitor, and an “Uncle Tom.”179 As Thomas 
himself explained, “These people are mad because I’m in Thurgood 
Marshall’s seat.”180 
The contrast between Thomas and his renowned predecessor, 
however, is merely one symbol of the larger reason many African 
Americans begrudge him: Thomas is an African American who has 
been given a rare opportunity to advance an African-American 
agenda, and he has instead chosen to chart a judicial path that many 
view as directly contrary to the interests of the African-American 
community.181 Indeed, Thomas is perhaps most famous for his 
passionate opposition to affirmative action, the “one big issue for 
most black people.”182 Not only has Thomas openly opposed 
 
 175. MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 262. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Jeffrey Toobin, The Burden of Clarence Thomas, NEW YORKER, Sept. 27, 1993, at 38, 
41, 42. 
 178. For a general discussion on the complex alienation Thomas has faced within the Black 
community, see Michael Dehaven Newsom, Clarence Thomas, Victim? Perhaps, and Victimizer? 
Yes—A Study in Social and Racial Alienation from African-Americans, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 327 
(2004). 
 179. MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 3, 12, 19. In 1998, the Joint Center for Political 
and Economic Studies determined that Thomas had only a 32 percent favorability rating among 
African Americans, lower than any other “prominent black figure” the center’s political analyst 
had ever examined. Id. at 4. 
 180. Id. at 271 (quoting Clarence Thomas). But cf. id. at 280 (“Clarence Thomas is not 
looking to be a black leader. I’m sure he never applied. He will never fit in Thurgood Marshall’s 
shoes. Those are not the shoes he wants to wear.” (quoting Donna Brazile)). 
 181. See id. at 19 (“Racial disillusionment is the common theme in all these 
demonstrations—not ideology, not politics, but the seething sense that one of the potential 
bright lights of the race has rejected his chance to shine.”). 
 182. Id. at 375 (“The civil rights movement has been boiled down to one big issue for most 
black people . . . affirmative action. . . . It’s like riding on the anti-gay marriage platform in 
Greenwich Village or Provincetown. . . . You’re going to be surprised when people are angry at 
you?” (quoting Henry Louis Gates Jr., Director of Harvard’s W.E.B. Du Bois Institute for 
African and African-American Research)). 
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affirmative action, but he appears to go out of his way to decry many 
civil rights legal principles—principles that are close to the hearts of 
most African Americans. 
Moreover, some contend that Thomas’s civil rights opinions are 
bolder than other Justices, because he is willing to say things that “no 
one [else] on the Court has the guts to say.”183 Even in cases in which 
Thomas votes with the majority, as he did in Adarand, Jenkins, and 
Parents Involved in Community Schools,184 he often writes separately 
to express positions that are more absolute than those taken by the 
majority.185 In Bush v. Vera,186 for example, Thomas was the only 
Justice on the Court who was unwilling to assume, for the purposes of 
the present case, that it was constitutional to intentionally create 
majority-minority districts.187 Thomas’s bold separate opinions have 
led some to characterize his civil rights jurisprudence as radical and 
extreme.188 As Justice Stevens explained: 
I would not find JUSTICE THOMAS’ extreme proposition—that there 
is a moral and constitutional equivalence between an attempt to 
subjugate and an attempt to redress the effects of a caste system—at 
all persuasive. It is one thing to question the wisdom of affirmative-
 
 183. GERBER, supra note 8, at 102 (quoting Robert Marquand, Thomas Leads Court’s Lean 
to the Right, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 26, 1995, at 1). As discussed in Part III.C, for 
example, Thomas was the first Justice to openly criticize the reasoning of Brown. See Missouri v. 
Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 114 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (criticizing the Brown Court for 
relying on social science to reach the conclusion that segregation in public schools is 
unconstitutional). 
 184. See discussion supra Part III.C. 
 185. E.g., Richard J. Dougherty, Essay, A Response to Originalism and Precedent: Principles 
and Practices in the Application of Stare Decisis, 6 AVE MARIA L. REV. 155, 170–71 (2007) 
(describing how Thomas often writes separately to distinguish his views from those of the 
majority). 
 186. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996). 
 187. See id. at 999 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (“In my view, application of 
strict scrutiny in this suit was never a close question. I cannot agree with JUSTICE O’CONNOR’s 
assertion that strict scrutiny is not invoked by the intentional creation of majority-minority 
districts.”). Additionally, whereas the Justices in the plurality insisted that race be the 
predominant factor, Justice Thomas found legislative action offensive when race was merely one 
motivation. Id. at 959 (plurality opinion) (“For strict scrutiny to apply, the plaintiffs must prove 
that other, legitimate districting principles were ‘subordinated’ to race. By that, we mean that 
race must be ‘the predominant factor motivating the legislature’s [redistricting] decision.’ We 
thus differ from JUSTICE THOMAS, who would apparently hold that it suffices that racial 
considerations be a motivation for the drawing of a majority-minority district.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 188. E.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 247 n.5 (1995) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
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action programs . . . . It is another thing altogether to equate the 
many well-meaning and intelligent lawmakers . . . who have 
supported affirmative action over the years, to segregationists and 
bigots.189 
Although Thomas’s opinions seem designed to renounce 
orthodox civil rights jurisprudence, race remains central to his judicial 
identity.190 Despite the criticism Thomas has received from African 
Americans, he continues to view himself as a noble civil rights soldier, 
doing “what he has to do” to challenge the conventional wisdom, just 
as Marshall and other leaders of the civil rights movement did what 
they had to in the mid-twentieth century.191 Indeed, Thomas believes 
that he has been unfairly vilified by African Americans because he is 
unwilling to surrender the fight for true racial equality.192 
And Thomas believes that, just like the civil rights leaders before 
him, he must suffer for his ideas before they can be vindicated.193 In 
front of a conservative audience at the Walter D. George School of 
Law, Thomas spoke of a “new brand of stereotypes and ad hominem 
assaults,” designed to target independent-minded African Americans, 
 
 189. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 190. MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 10 (“Even as Thomas goes about his work, 
perhaps the purest conservative on the court, it’s his racial identity that most defines 
him. . . . [T]he racial prism . . . is the prism through which Thomas often views himself.”). 
 191. See id. at 23 (“The courageous underdog is one of his favorite personas, adopted by him 
in countless speeches and observed by friends in private conversation. Putting on his battle 
armor—seeing himself as a man under attack for his ideas—is one of the ways that Thomas 
copes with the ostracism he endures from blacks who disagree with him. . . . [Thomas] has 
turned himself into the most successful victim in America.”); see also id. at 231 (“Having an 
enemy to fight is what links Thomas and the conservative faithful.”). 
 192. See id. at 226 (“[M]y only choice was to stand up for my views or abandon them . . . to 
turn and run from myself, to abandon my views without being convinced that they were the 
wrong views.” (quoting Clarence Thomas)); see also GERBER, supra note 8, at 33 (“Does a black 
man instantaneously become ‘insensitive,’ a ‘dupe’ or an ‘Uncle Tom,’ because he happens to 
disagree with the policy of affirmative action?” (quoting Clarence Thomas, Speech Delivered at 
Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University, May 1, 1993)). 
 193. See Toobin, supra note 177, at 40 (“Thomas said that when he arrived in Washington, 
people with beliefs such as his, especially blacks, were dismissed as ‘sellouts’ or ‘insensitive’ and 
that as a Reagan Administration official he had been called ‘an ultra-conservative.’ He added—
as if such addition were necessary—‘Later, I would be called worse things.’ It was time now ‘for 
regrouping and rejuvenation,’ he said. ‘As I look out in the audience today, I see hope.’”); see 
also supra note 11; cf. MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 337 (“[Thomas] discussed the 
confirmation battle in terms usually reserved for religious allegory . . . . ‘I watched in horror as 
people who claimed to be on the side of some greater good tore at my very soul,’ Thomas said. 
‘But . . . I found strength by running toward God . . . . [T]he burdens of unfairness and 
frustration became an opportunity to be virtue[ous].’”). 
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like himself, who “dare to question current social and cultural 
gimmicks,” or “dare to disagree with the latest ideological fad.”194 In 
this new world of bigotry, segregation on the basis of “color” has 
given way to segregation of the basis of “[n]onconforming [i]deas.”195 
As a result, Thomas claimed, he has been forced to “pay for [his] 
ideological trespasses” through “systematic character 
assassination[s],” which he called “the modern-day version of the old 
public floggings.”196 
In truth, Thomas’s rhetoric is somewhat exaggerated. The civil 
rights protestors of the mid-twentieth century were forced to endure 
tear gas, fire hoses, and billy clubs, whereas Thomas’s “modern-day 
flogging” mostly consists of fairly ordinary public scrutiny.197 Thomas, 
who is notoriously sensitive to criticism,198 is nothing if not dramatic.199 
He frequently compares his critics to slave-owners and Ku Klux Klan 
members,200 drawing “absurd” analogies “between the difficult but 
routine challenges that public figures must weather and the most 
oppressive and vile chapter in American history.”201 Although the 
specifics of his analogies vary, Thomas always casts himself as the 
courageous victim who dares to think independently, and he always 
casts his critics as the narrow-minded bigots who are out to demean 
him: 
For daring to reject the ideological orthodoxy that was prescribed 
for blacks by liberal whites, I was branded a traitor to my race—as if 
anyone . . . had the right to tell me what beliefs a black man was 
permitted to hold. If I dared to step out of line, if I refused to be 
 
 194. Toobin, supra note 177, at 39 (quoting Clarence Thomas). 
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another invisible man, then I wasn’t really black, I was an Uncle 
Tom doing Massa’s bidding.202 
More than anything, however, Thomas views himself as 
misunderstood.203 He believes that he has “embrace[d] the values that 
have worked” for African Americans, and “reject[ed] those that have 
failed.”204 In his own mind, he is fighting for a “positive” civil rights 
agenda, rather than merely fighting against affirmative action.205 In a 
speech to a national audience of African-American lawyers in 1998, 
Thomas made a heartfelt attempt to correct this misunderstanding: 
It pains me deeply—more deeply than any of you can imagine—to 
be perceived by so many members of my race as doing them 
harm. . . . All the sacrifice, all the long hours of preparation were to 
help, not to hurt. . . . I have come here today not in anger or to 
anger. . . . Nor have I come to defend my views, but rather to assert 
my right to think for myself, to refuse to have my ideas assigned to 
me as though I was an intellectual slave because I am black.206 
Despite Thomas’s desire to be embraced by African Americans 
as a civil rights hero of his time, he seems to have lost faith in his own 
generation. He no longer hopes to convert his political opponents, 
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only to outlive them.207 Instead, Thomas has placed his faith in the 
fresh minds of African-American children, for whom he always 
makes time: 
  [Thomas] spotted a group of black fourth and fifth graders from a 
private academy and, hoping to inspire them, sidled over. This was 
vintage Thomas, always drawn to the children in a room. . . . 
  . . . In children, Thomas sees uncluttered minds, fresh 
possibilities, hope—the hope that maybe they won’t prejudge him, 
won’t view him through the lens of their elders, some of whom he 
believes are stuck on old ideas. Maybe they will grow up to become 
independent thinkers, which is how Thomas sees himself. So he’s 
never too busy for the kids. . . .208 
This anecdote demonstrates Thomas’s hope that the next 
generation of African Americans will embrace his equal protection 
jurisprudence, ushering in a new era of African-American thought. 
Only then can Thomas solidify his legacy as the great civil rights 
leader he believes himself to be. 
B. Writing for the Future 
For Thomas, Harlan and his renowned civil rights dissents 
demonstrate how unpopular opinions can prevail with time.209 
Although Harlan was sometimes called the “Great Dissenter” in the 
early twentieth century, the label primarily referred to his tax and 
antitrust dissents.210 Harlan’s contemporaries largely dismissed his 
civil rights dissents as moralizing and eccentric.211 Not until Brown 
“sent scholars scrambling to study him” was Harlan, “the lone 
champion of black civil rights on the turn-of-the century Court,” 
finally “hailed as a prophet.”212 
Thus, it was not Harlan’s civil rights dissents themselves that 
earned Harlan his legacy of greatness, but rather society’s 
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determination that his dissents were correct. History vindicated 
Harlan only because his opinions accurately foreshadowed a change 
in the law.213 Despite the fact that Harlan’s dissents were not even 
mentioned in the 1953 edition of the Encyclopedia of American 
History, for example, “Harlan made it onto a list of great judges in 
1958 primarily on the weight of those dissents.”214 Now, when Harlan 
is called the Court’s “first great dissenter,” the label celebrates his 
civil rights dissents.215 
Part of the reason that Thomas relates to Harlan, this Note 
contends, is because Thomas’s contemporaries often dismiss him just 
as Harlan’s contemporaries dismissed Harlan at the turn of the 
twentieth century.216 Scholars often question Thomas’s significance as 
a Justice, dismissing Thomas as peculiar217 and irrelevant.218 To some 
extent, Thomas’s radical ideology and stubborn temperament have 
reduced his contemporary significance on the Court. As “the most 
conservative” Justice on the Court,219 Thomas is more willing than 
some of his ideological allies to “extend[] his line of thinking to its 
logical conclusion, regardless of the disruptive effects a ruling would 
have on American society.”220 Furthermore, Thomas is rarely willing 
to compromise even on small points.221 As a result, Thomas is “not 
much of a player in his workplace.”222 He is “ideologically isolated” 
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and “strategically marginal,”223 having written a body of majority 
opinions that is “notably thin on constitutionally significant cases.”224 
Following Harlan’s path, Thomas seeks to influence the law 
through passionate separate opinions, rather than through coalitions 
with his fellow Justices.225 In the Court’s more momentous cases, 
“Thomas’s voice is most often heard in strongly worded dissents and 
concurrences that he believes one day will become law.”226 Writing 
separately, Thomas is able to distinguish his beliefs from those of his 
colleagues and eternalize his role as an individual Justice. Moreover, 
through his separate opinions, Thomas is able to preserve his ideas 
until the country is ready to vindicate them. 
Thomas’s lonely separate opinions may make him appear 
marginalized and inconsequential to scholars. And perhaps Thomas 
is, for scholars of his generation. But Thomas may not write his 
separate opinions for his contemporaries—perhaps he writes them for 
the future. As a proponent of natural law, Thomas likely believes that 
the United States is on a divine mission, and that his views are an 
inevitable part of that mission.227 But as confident as Thomas may be 
that his views will be vindicated, without his separate opinions there 
would be little for the next generation to celebrate if and when that 
day comes. Like Harlan, Thomas has sacrificed his significance and 
relevancy on the Court so that he, through his words, can become 
significant in legacy. 
CONCLUSION 
Thomas views himself as an honorable civil rights soldier who 
has sacrificed his contemporary reputation to fulfill an ideal that the 
founders promised, that Abraham Lincoln proclaimed, and of which 
Martin Luther King, Jr., dreamed. In this crusade, Thomas has used 
Harlan’s words and principles to manipulate the meaning of Brown in 
favor of his own equal protection philosophy. He has read Harlan’s 
colorblind Constitution to endorse an ideology identical to his own. In 
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Harlan’s words, Thomas sees the very reasons he is conservative and 
the very foundation of his own judicial philosophy. In Harlan’s 
principles, Thomas sees the cause for which he claims to have 
suffered and the hope by which he perseveres. In Harlan’s story, 
Thomas sees the possibility of redemption. 
But only when his lonely opinions foreshadow a change in the 
law, as Harlan’s did, can Thomas assume his position in the history 
books as one of the Court’s “great dissenters” and as one of the 
United States’ prophetic leaders of civil rights. Therefore, when 
Thomas encounters a classification on the basis of race, he writes with 
a passion intended not only for the contemporary reader but also for 
the history books. He writes categorically and consistently, and he 
articulates his colorblind perspective with fervor unrivaled by his 
fellow Justices. When Thomas writes a civil rights opinion that could 
be considered radical or extreme, he does so for a different 
generation. But as Thomas himself has shown, aspiring prophets 
come with their own agendas, and words are easy to manipulate. 
